We’re starting Seder Kodshim in daf yomi beginning with Zevachim. So before I write anything I should first preface that this is my first time through Kodshim – so it’s entirely possible that I’ll say stuff that will be demonstrably wrong on the next page, but I figure I may as well write down my impressions as I go.
The mishna starts off saying that all of the zevachim (sacrifices that are slaughtered) that were slaughtered shelo lishman (not for their own sake) are valid – but they have not satisfied their owners obligation. An example would be if one brought a burnt offering and slaughtered it for a peace offering (Rashi), in this circumstance the korban is valid, but the owner had not satisfied his obligation to bring a peace offering and must bring another. Two exceptions are the Passover offering and a sin offering.
Rava is quick to point out that the Mishna word choice “slaughtered not for their own sake” (as a opposed to “not slaughtered for their own sake”) implies that if they were slaughtered without any explicit intention – they would satisfy their owner’s obligation. He contrasts this with gittin (divorce documents) which must be written expressly “for the sake” of the woman being divorced.
He resolves this contradiction by saying that generally a consecrated animal is already designated to be slaughtered for its proper purpose whereas generally a woman is not designated for divorce.
He then attempts to resolve another contradiction and further his opinion:
Rav Yehuda says Rav said, a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is invalid, but a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of chullin (not a korban, just to eat as regular meat) is kosher
Rava deduces from this statement that not only is lack of explicit intent not a problem, even the wrong intent is only problematic if the wrong intent is for a similar thing (like another sacrifice).[BTW, I haven’t finished but I think this last thesis is rejected. This is apparent later on and seems to be what Rashi means when he says that Rava is “under the impression” that Rav’s ruling is his own reasoning (as opposed to a ruling he derives from scripture) and is explaining his reasoning (see Rashi 3a לשם חולין כשרה).]
Anyhow, before we get started we have to realize that there are caveats to this statement that Rav Yehuda quotes from Rav. One of such caveats is that this only means that if someone knows that the animal is a korban and for some reason slaughters it for the sake of chullin it is kosher, but if he actually thinks it’s chullin – it is invalid (see Tosfas 2b Zevachim quoting from page 46b).
The second is, at least according to Abaye (and the Rambam rules like him) this merely means that the offering is kosher, but the owners haven’t fulfilled their obligation. This last caveat is interesting because Rava at this point seems to disagree as according to this interpretation all Rav does is make a sin offering like any other offering that was slaughtered shelo lishman when it is slaughtered lishem chullin, it does not make it considered lishman as Rava claims.
Some Notes To Self (to possibly revise later):
עיין טורי אבן ר”ה כט ע”א בעינן מצוות צריכות כוונה
יל”ע מאי יועיל הא דמצוותן מיוחד בגופן
סתירת הרמב”ם בהל’ חמץ ומצה והלכות שופר
לגבי קדושת ה’ בסת”ם אי אמרינן סתמן לקדושה עומדת